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INTRODUCTION

This case note reviews Sinclair v. EPA. A case in which the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Skidmore deference to review whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exceeded congressional authority
when the agency interpreted “disproportionate economic hardship” into the
Renewable Fuel Standards program exemption extension review process.
1

Aaron White, J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like
to thank Professor Mehmet Konar-Steenberg for his guidance on this article. I would also
like to thank my wife, Sarah, for her encouragement.
1
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017).
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This note argues that the majority opinion applied the wrong type of
deference and examined facts of the case too narrowly. By twisting
interpretations and focusing on insignificant words, The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the EPA inaccurately applied their review standards. The
Tenth Circuit’s decision resulted in an unnecessary circuit split.
Part II of this note is an analysis of the surrounding doctrinal history,
reviewing the specific types of deference discussed in this case, legislative
history, and relevant circuit decisions. Next, Part III outlines the Sinclair
decision. Specifically, it provides an analysis of the court of appeal’s main
arguments and dissenting opinion. Part IV compares the facts of the case
against relevant case law to highlight tensions in the law related to the Tenth
Circuit’s decision.
2

3

4

5

6

7

II. HISTORY

A. Deference History
In reviewing Sinclair and relevant case law, it is important to be familiar
with the types of deference courts may grant administrative agencies. This
section provides a brief history and summary of the cases that created the
types of deference referred to in the Sinclair case. Specifically, this section
explores Skidmore and Chevron deference. Skidmore deference provides
judicial respect to an agency’s determination when that decision was made
based on internal experience and informed judgement. Chevron deference
applies a two-pronged test to determine if delegated powers were ambiguous
and if the agency interpretation was reasonable. Subsequent sections discuss
the significance of the cases and how they are applied within the context of
the Sinclair case.
8

1.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co.

In 1944, Jim Skidmore and six of his fellow firemen and support staff
sued Swift & Company under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 over
unpaid overtime wages. An oral employment agreement required
9

2

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Part II.
4
See infra Part II.
5
See infra Part III.
6
See infra Section III.B–C.
7
See infra Part IV.
8
See infra Part III.
3

9

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135 (1944) (referencing 29 U.S.C. §201
(1938)).
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employees to stay overnight on or near company property and be available
in the event of a fire emergency. The parties argued over whether the time
spent waiting for a fire emergency was, in fact, “work time” for which the
employees should be compensated. The district court denied the claim,
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that the district court and court of appeals
erred. The Court pointed out that there was no law distinguishing wait time
from work time. This dispute was a question of fact that required resolution
by interpretation of the construction of the employment agreement. The
Court stated that this was a difficult task, one which Congress did not
provide clarification for nor grant power to administrative agencies to assist
in. Due to this oversight, courts were left to determine if wait time was work
time. In Skidmore, the Office of Administrator was available and provided
an opinion within an amicus brief. The Office had expertise in interpreting
activities that could constitute compensated wait time. The Court
remanded the case for further proceedings in which the Office of
Administrator’s opinions were to be considered.
The Supreme Court’s decision thus created a deference test known as
Skidmore deference. While a court is not required to defer to an agency,
deference should be granted if the agency’s interpretation is persuasive. To
determine an agency’s persuasiveness, a court must consider how thorough
the investigation was, how consistent the interpretation has been over time,
10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

10

Id.
Id. at 136.
12
Id. at 135.
13
Id. at 140.
14
Id. at 136.
15
Id. at 137.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 139.
11

18

Congress created the Office of Administrator, within the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor (DOL), and imposed powers within that office to become familiar with
industry standards and make interpretations of laws. Id. at 138. “They provide a practical
guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its
enforcement will seek to apply it.” Id. at 139.
19

Id.
Id. at 138–39.
21
Id. at 140.
20

22

U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).

204

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

how valid the argument is, the agency’s expertise in the field, and other
persuasive factors important to the agency’s position.
Skidmore deference has been applied in cases where a statutory
interpretation was made by an agency, but the interpretation did not carry
the force of law. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., the Court was
faced with a decision as to whether the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII,
as it related to discrimination of non-U.S. citizens in other countries, was
persuasive. The Court found that the appropriate deference test to apply
was Skidmore, as the interpretation was not part of a legislative rulemaking.
In Christensen v. Harris County, the Court determined whether an
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act published in official
documents was persuasive. Again, the Court found the interpretation
lacked the force of law and determined that Skidmore was the appropriate
test to apply. In both of these cases, the Court ruled against the agency,
finding the agency’s reasoning for their interpretation unpersuasive.
23

24

25

26

27

28

29

2.

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council

Following the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, the EPA was tasked
with creating rules to allow states that had not met ambient air quality
standards to establish a permit program “regulating ‘new or modified major
stationary sources’ of air pollution.” In 1981, the EPA promulgated a rule
within a permit requirement allowing states to “adopt a plantwide definition
of the term ‘stationary source.’” The rule essentially allowed entities to
30

31

23

Id.; see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40 (stating that the Administrator’s policies and
standards may be entitled to respect because they are based upon specialized experience and
broader investigations).
24
See generally Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
25
Arabian Oil, 499 U.S. at 257.
26

Id.
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
28
Id.
29
Id.; Arabian Oil, 499 U.S. at 257.
27

30

Chevron, Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)
(1977)).
31
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1983)). The regulation reads as follows:
(i) ‘Stationary source’ means any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act.
(ii) ‘Building, structure, facility, or installation’ means all of the pollutant-emitting
activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or
more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same
person (or persons under common control) except the activities of any vessel.
40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i) and (ii) (1983).
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group their industrial equipment under one “bubble.” Any modification or
installation within this “bubble” or grouping that did not increase the total
emissions produced did not require additional permitting.
The Natural Resource Defense Council filed a timely petition to
challenge the EPA’s adoption of the “bubble concept.” The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals set aside the EPA’s regulation, stating that the Clean Air
Act “does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a ‘stationary
source,’ to which the permit program [applies].” In addition, the court of
appeals noted that the “bubble concept” was not expressly addressed within
the legislative history. Furthermore, the court of appeals emphasized that
the purpose of the legislation should be considered with regard to any
associated regulation. Congress’s intention was to reduce emissions in
states that did not meet the ambient air quality standards. The court of
appeals found that the “bubble concept” would undermine congressional
intent by creating a loophole where operators could avoid updating their
facilities with pollution-reducing technologies as long as their entire facilities’
emissions did not increase.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the Natural
Resource Defense Council and court of appeals. The Court pointed out
that the legislative history related to this issue was not specific enough to
establish “a Congressional desire.” Next, the Supreme Court noted that,
given the ambiguity around this issue, the EPA must be allowed discretion
to meet both the economic and environmental concerns within this
regulation. Upon review of the public record created during the rulemaking
process, the EPA showed a rational explanation behind the “bubble
concept.”
The result of this decision created a two-pronged test “requiring courts
to defer to interpretations of statutes made by those government agencies
charged with enforcing them, unless such interpretations are
32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

32
33

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
Id.

34

NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Chevron, 467 U.S.
837.
35
Id. at 723.
36

Id.
Id. at 725–26.
38
Id. at 726.
39
Id.
37

40

Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
Id. at 862.
42
Id. at 863.
41

43

Id.
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unreasonable.” The test is referred to as Chevron deference, or the
Chevron two-step. A court must consider two questions when reviewing an
agency’s statutory interpretation. First, or Chevron step one, the court must
determine if Congress has discussed the exact question at issue. Second, or
Chevron step two, if Congress has not spoken directly to the issue, the court
must ask if the agency’s reasonable interpretation is a “permissible
construction of the statute.”
For Chevron deference to apply, the agency must be making a statutory
interpretation under the direction of Congress. For example, in Northern
California River Watch v. Wilcox, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
California Department of Fish and Game’s action of digging up plants was
a violation of the Endangered Species Act. The issue was whether the
statutory phrase of “areas under Federal jurisdiction” was interpreted
correctly. The Ninth Circuit noted that Chevron only applies “when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency’s interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” The Ninth
Circuit determined that Congress had not delegated authority to the state of
California to interpret “areas under Federal jurisdiction.” As such,
Chevron deference was not granted. It was noted that some degree of
deference should be granted to the California Department of Fish and
Game, but the deference should be that of a reasonable interpretation, or
Skidmore deference.
In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Court explained in greater detail when
to apply Chevron. Here, the Court determined that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) properly interpreted an ambiguous
statutory requirement for reasonable timeframes under the
44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

44

David Kemp, Chevron Deference: Your Guide to Understanding Two of Today’s
Decisions,
JUSTIA
L.
BLOG
(May
21,
2012),
https://lawblog.justia.com/2012/05/21/chevron-deference-your-guide-to-understanding-twoof-todays-scotus-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/4VFF-JFVS].

SCOTUS

45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013); N. Cal. River Watch v.
46

Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2011).
49
Wilcox, 633 F.3d at 769.
50

Id.
Id. at 776 (quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 776, 780.
51
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Telecommunications Act. The FCC required state zoning authorities to
make a determination of wireless siting applications “within a reasonable
amount of time.” The Court determined that the decision to apply
Chevron should turn on whether the agency’s decision was within the scope
of its granted authority. The Court held that the “preconditions to
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress had
unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”
55

56

57

58

3.

When Deference is Applied

When determining which type of deference to apply, it is important to
note the agency activity being reviewed. Is the agency carrying some
delegation from Congress in which an ambiguous statute requires
interpretation? Or is the agency making an interpretation without a legal
requirement? Chevron deference is given when an agency interprets a law
through promulgated rules which are enforced by law. Because of this high
regard, the decision is binding unless a court determines it unreasonable.
For circumstances where an interpretation does not carry the force of law,
Skidmore is the appropriate deference to give.
59

60

61

62

63

64

55

City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
Id. at 294.
57
Id. at 297.
58
Id. at 307. There is a third form of deference that may be provided. Auer deference applies
to interpretations of an agency’s ambiguous regulation. Borgen, infra note 59, at 5. This style
of deference arose out of Auer v. Robbins, in which the DOL was challenged on an
interpretation within its own regulation. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 (1997) (holding
the Fair Labor Standards Act granted the DOL the authority to “define and delimit” the
scope of statutory exemptions under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)). However, because the Sinclair
case is a controversy over an EPA interpretation rising from a Congressional delegation, Auer
deference will not apply in this analysis.
59
David Borgen & Jennifer Liu, Significant Legal Developments in Wage and Hour Law:
Deference
Standards,
3
(Oct.
19,
2007),
https://gbdhlegal.com/wpcontent/uploads/article/NELA_Paper.2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LD5-SSCG].
56

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 4.
63
Id.
64
Id.; see, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (Skidmore deference is
61

appropriate in instances such as “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals and enforcement guidelines.”).
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United States v. Mead Corp. is an important decision that provides
direction as to when Chevron or Skidmore deference should be used. In
Mead, the Supreme Court determined whether a tariff schedule was to be
given “judicial deference.” Mead Corporation, the Respondent, was
importing day planners that fell within the scope of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Items belonging under
subheading 4820 could have a four percent tariff or could be tariff free
depending on the specific classification. In 1993, the United States
Customs Service changed how it identified Mead’s products, which
historically were placed under the tariff-free category and began imposing a
four percent tariff. The change occurred based on the definition given to
the planners. While ruling on the case, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals did not apply deference.
The Supreme Court provided guidance as to when Chevron and
Skidmore deference should be applied. A court should apply Chevron
deference when ruling on an administrative implementation that Congress
has delegated to an agency through a statutory provision. In addition, that
authority must require that the agency promulgate a rule carrying the force
of law, without the agency exceeding its authority in doing so. The Court
noted that when the standards for Chevron deference are not met, an agency
is not disqualified from deference. Skidmore deference should apply if the
agency meets the necessary criteria. In Mead, the Court determined that
65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

65

U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 221.
67
19 U.S.C. § 1202. U.S. Customs further identified Respondent’s products as fitting under
HTSUS subheading 4820.10. Mead, 533 U.S. at 224.
68
Mead, 533 U.S. at 224. Under HTSUS subheading 4820.10, items such as account books,
receipt books, letter pads, and diaries were subject to the four percent tariff. Id. Under
subheading 4820.10.40, which covered a broad “other” category, items were not subject to a
tariff. Id. at 224–25.
69
Id. at 225.
70
Id. (noting that Customs changed the classification of day planners to “‘diaries . . . bound’
subject to tariff under subheading 4820.10.20.”).
71
Id. at 225–26.
72
Id. at 226.
73
Id. at 226–27.
74
Id. at 234.
75
Id. at 227. The criteria a court should use in determining whether Skidmore deference
applies includes the thoroughness of the investigation, the consistency of the interpretation
over time, the validity of the argument, the agency’s expertise in the field, and the
persuasiveness of the agency’s arguments. Id. at 228; see also id. at 234 (quoting Christensen
v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[C]lassification rulings are best treated like
‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines.’ They are beyond the Chevron pale.”)).
66
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classification of an item did not rise to the level in which Chevron deference
should be applied.
Building on Mead, an important distinction was raised in Barnhart v.
Walton. In Barnhart, the Court reviewed whether a definition of the word
“disability” was applied correctly to Social Security benefits. Specifically,
the Social Security Administration determined that if a physical impairment
did not prohibit a person from gaining meaningful, successful employment
for more than twelve months, that person did not qualify for disability
benefits. The Court held that, based on Chevron, this interpretation was
within “the Agency’s lawful interpretive authority.”
The Court found some rules that go through an informal rule-making
process may still be afforded Chevron deference. In fact, Mead was used
to show that Chevron was applied in previous cases to agency interpretations
that did not go through notice-and-comment rule making. The Court
determined that, for those situations, considerations for deference should
be based on the method the agency used to interpret the statute and what is
being asked. The key factors the Court considers in these situations are:
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise
of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of
the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period
of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal
lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation
here at issue.
This approach seeks to answer the larger question of what power
Congress intended to delegate to the agency. In this manner, the Supreme
Court has effectively established that determining whether Chevron should
apply requires a case-by-case analysis. Essentially, Barnhart sets a process
76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

76

Id. at 238.

77

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
Id. at 214.
79
Id. at 214–15.
80
Id. at 215.
81
Id. at 221.
82
Id. at 222.
78

83

Id.
Id. (referencing U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–34 (2001)).
85
William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61
84

ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 293 (2009).
86
Id. at 294.
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in which “a search for thoughtful exercise of agency expertise” is
conducted.
87

B.

Legislative History

This section will review the key components of the history surrounding
the Renewable Fuels Standards Program at issue in the Sinclair case and the
Department of Energy’s 2011 study. These components are important to
understand as they help clarify what the Court of Appeals is considering.

1.

The Renewable Fuels Standards Program Under the Energy
Policy Act of 2005

In 2005 Congress passed, and President George W. Bush signed into
law, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the Energy Act). The Energy Act was
an amendment to the Clean Air Act (CAA), designed to promote the use of
renewable fuels. The Energy Act encompassed a wide array of topics, but
the central focus was energy production in the United States. Proponents
argued that it was a necessary bill to combat the rising fuel costs in America.
The bill provided tax incentives and guaranteed loans for innovative
greenhouse gas reducing technology.
Opponents to the Energy Act pointed out numerous flaws and
environmentally dangerous provisions. Some felt that the Energy Act was
nothing more than unnecessary subsidies granted to the nuclear and oil
industries. Specifically, the Energy Act “include[d] an estimated $85 billion
worth of subsidies and tax breaks for most forms of energy . . . .” In
88

89

90

91

92

93

94

87

Id. at 294 n.248 (summarizing Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury:
Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
22 (2004)).
88
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 15801 (2005)); see also Energy Policy Act of 2005, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Energy_Policy_Act_of_2005
[https://perma.cc/K986-WGLF]
[hereinafter BALLOTPEDIA].
89
See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2009); see also 40 C.F.R. § 80.1429 (2014).
90
Summary of the Energy Policy Act, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: LAWS AND
REGULATIONS,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-energy-policy-act
[https://perma.cc/36DG-7J4F].
91
Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 88; see also BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 88.
92
Summary of the Energy Policy Act, supra note 90.
93
Michael Grunwald & Juliet Eilperin, Energy Bill Raises Fears About Pollution, Fraud,
WASH.
POST
(Jul.
30,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072901128.html?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/BT8M-4GWZ].
94

Id.
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addition, opponents felt many provisions weakened environmental
protections. For example, the Energy Act undermined the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974 by exempting fracking operations from regulation.
Specifically, the Energy Act removed the EPA’s obligation from regulating
the oil and gas operations associated with fracking. For the purposes of this
case note, the provisions of the Energy Act that will be reviewed are those
associated with the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program.
The RFS program places a requirement on oil refineries to produce
fuels from “renewable biomass” or to purchase credits from other
refineries. The renewable fuel produced is categorized under Renewable
Identification Numbers (RINs). To be in good standing, a refinery must
obtain the requisite number of RINs by the end of a year. In addition, a
time scale was set in place for clear goals that refineries were meant to hit by
certain dates. Congress delegated authority to the EPA to promulgate rules
to ensure that the goals of the program were achieved.
Congress recognized that there could be unintended consequences to
small refineries with this new program. As such, a provision within the
amendment provided small refineries experiencing “disproportionate
economic hardship” an exemption from the program. This exemption was
set in place for all small refineries and ended in 2011.
The Department of Energy (DOE) was charged with conducting a
study to determine if the regulations placed a “disproportionate economic
hardship” on small refineries. For those refineries found to suffer a
“disproportionate economic hardship,” an additional two-year exemption
would be granted. The study concluded that “[i]f certain small refineries
must purchase RINs that are far more expensive than those that may be
95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

95

Renee Lewis Kosnik, The Oil and Gas Industry’s Exclusions and Exemptions to Major
Environmental Statutes, EARTH WORKS & OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1, 8
(2007),
https://www.minnesotaikes.org/resolutions/2016-08Background-NEPA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3W3J-AM7R].
96

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2009).
98
Id. at § 7545(o)(2).
97

99

Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2017) (“A RIN is created
when a producer makes a gallon of renewable fuel, blends the renewable fuel with petroleumbased fuel, and sells the resulting product domestically.”).
100
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5).
101
Id. at § 7545(o)(2)(B).
102
Id. at § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).
103
Id. at § 7545(o)(9).
104
Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i).
105
Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I).
106
Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
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generated through blending, . . . [a] disproportionate economic hardship for
those effected entities” will occur.
Additionally, Congress assigned the EPA the task of overseeing an
additional exemption program. Under the Act, refineries that met the
definition of a small refinery could petition the EPA for an exemption.
Congress provided that if a small refinery suffered a “disproportionate
economic hardship” because of the RFS program, the refinery could
petition the EPA for an exemption extension. Congress specifically
directed the EPA to “consult with DOE and consider the findings of DOE’s
study in addition to ‘other economic factors.’” The statute does not
provide a definition for “disproportionate economic hardship.”
In 2010 the EPA promulgated rules through a formal rule-making
process for the RFS program. Within these rules, the EPA codified the
process by which a small refinery may apply for an exemption extension
petition and created a timeline for the EPA to rule on that petition. Within
the preamble of the Federal Register, where the final rule was published,
the EPA discussed how the agency would approach factors that could create
a “disproportional economic impact” to small refineries. The EPA noted
that the agency would follow the direction provided by the results of the
DOE’s 2011 study.
107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

107

Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017).
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B).
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Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). “The term ‘small refinery’ means a refinery for which the average
aggregate daily crude oil throughput for a calendar year (as determined by dividing the
aggregate throughput for the calendar year by the number of days in the calendar year) does
not exceed 75,000 barrels.” Id. at § 7545(o)(1)(K).
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Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(B).
111
Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 989; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii); S. REP. NO. 111-45, at
109 (2009).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1).
113
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670 (Mar. 26, 2010) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 80); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (delegating authority to the EPA to
promulgate rules to regulate the RFS program).
114
40 C.F.R. 80.1441(e)(2) (2014).
115
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. at 14,736.
116
Id. At the time the final rule had been codified, the DOE had yet to complete the 2011
study. Id. The EPA noted the small refineries’ concerns about the conclusions of the DOE’s
first study, which was completed in 2005. Id. The agency made assurances that once the
DOE’s new study was completed, the EPA would revisit the petition standards and that any
decision would be consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Id.
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The Department of Energy’s 2011 Study

The DOE’s 2011 study outlined the impact the new RFS regulations
had on small refineries and established a system of factors to review when
determining whether a refinery qualified for further exemptions. At the
conclusion of that study, fifty-nine small refineries in the United States were
deemed to face continual “disproportionate economic hardship” if not
exempted from the regulation. Those refineries were given an exemption
extension through 2013. The study determined that two factors should be
analyzed for each refinery: “a high cost of compliance relative to the industry
average, and an effect sufficient to cause a significant impairment of the
refinery operations.” These factors are referred to, respectively, as an
impacts index and a viability index. To qualify for an exemption, a refinery
needs to score higher than a one on both indices.
The impacts index (sometimes referred to as the disproportionate
impacts index) is assessed by examining eight components. The original
scoring for this index was either a zero (no impact) or a ten (high impact).
However, the DOE added an intermediate score (five) in 2013.
The viability index measures three components. “[First,] whether
compliance costs would eliminate efficiency gains to the refinery; [second]
whether individual special events would adversely affect the refinery; and
[third] whether compliance costs would likely lead to a shutdown of the
refinery.” The scores are again either a zero, five, or ten. The scores are
tallied and divided by six to get the viability score. If a score is greater than
one, then a viability hardship is determined to exist.
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Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 993–94 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 990.

Id.
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Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573.
122
Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1000 (Lucero, J., dissenting). The eight components are percentage
of diesel production, access to capital/credit, availability of other cash flows, local market,
state regulation, relative refining margin, blending capability, and niche market. Id.
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Hermes, 787 F.3d at 576.
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Id. “DOE added an ‘intermediate score[ ]’ in order to ‘more accurately characterize the
impacts of compliance costs . . . on a refinery.’” Id. “The intermediate score ‘allows for more
nuanced and accurate characterization of the’ refinery’s situation.” Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792
F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015).
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Case Law History
1.

Hermes Consolidated v. EPA

One of the more recent cases that evaluates the economic hardship
exemption is Hermes Consolidated v. EPA. Hermes Consolidated, doing
business as Wyoming Refining Company (WRC), is a small refining
company operating in Newcastle, Wyoming. Due to the refinery’s
production size, it was eligible for the small refinery exemption and the twoyear DOE exemption extension. In 2013, WRC petitioned the EPA to
extend the hardship exemption, claiming “financial stress caused by the
skyrocketing price of RINs.” The EPA denied WRC’s request. WRC
challenged the EPA’s finding, claiming that the interpretation of
“disproportionate economic hardship” contradicted the plain language of
the statute and that the evaluation method adopted was arbitrary and
capricious.
In determining whether WRC qualified for the exemption extension,
the EPA consulted with the DOE. The EPA provided the DOE with
WRC’s data, which was then analyzed pursuant to the methodology
established in the DOE’s 2011 study. “WRC scored higher than 1 on the
disproportionate impacts index but less than 1 on the viability index.
Because the viability index fell below the threshold of 1, and a value greater
than 1 in both indices is required, the DOE declined to recommend
[extension of] WRC’s exemption.” The EPA then reviewed the data and
came to the same conclusion, “finding . . . no disproportionate economic
hardship.”
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals used Chevron deference to
determine whether the EPA interpreted “disproportionate economic
hardship.” WRC argued that considering a viability index within the
framework of “disproportionate economic hardship” contradicted the plain
128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138
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See Hermes, 787 F.3d 568.
Id. at 571.
130
Id. at 573.
131
Id. at 574.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 574–76.
134
Id. at 574 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) (2009) (Congress directed the EPA to
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consult with the DOE in evaluating hardship petitions.)).
135
Id. at 574.
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Id.
Id.
138
Id.
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language of the statute. The D.C. Circuit Court pointed out that Congress
did not provide a precise definition but rather gave the EPA general
guidance to evaluate exemption extensions. Specifically, the EPA was
required to consult with the DOE and “consider the findings of the [2011
study] and other economic factors.” As Congress did not provide more
explicit instructions, Chevron step one was met, and the D.C. Circuit Court
moved on to Chevron step two.
The EPA’s use of the DOE’s 2011 study methodology as it related to
the viability index was determined to be a permissible construction of the
statute under Chevron step two. The EPA’s rationale for why
“disproportionate economic hardship” modeled the 2011 study was
because “[t]he basis for any grant of an exemption extension by EPA in
response to an individual petition is the same as the basis of evaluation in
the [2011 study] . . . .” As both steps of the Chevron two-step were satisfied,
deference and discretion of the exemption extension reviewal processes lay
with the EPA.
WRC also challenged the review process, stating that the evaluation
change, which incorporated an intermediate score within the tested indices,
was effectively a rule change and, without explanation, that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit disagreed because the EPA had
addressed the change. Specifically, the EPA noted that “the addition of an
intermediate score to the efficiency-gains metric allows for more nuanced
and accurate characterization of the impact of compliance costs.”
Furthermore, the 2011 study explained that the original score was meant to
protect refineries from “immediate shutdown” and that it was expected for
exemption holders to take steps to reduce the program impacts in the
future. Specifically, the study pointed out that refineries could reduce the
initial score, so the adoption of an intermediate scoring system was in line
with the findings of the DOE’s study. The D.C. Circuit held that, because
the EPA consulted with the DOE, and because Congress did not provide
the DOE any further direction on how to prepare the study, the change in
139
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scoring was not arbitrary and capricious. Because the change was
reasonably explained, the D.C. Circuit was unable to conclude a rulemaking
process was necessary. The case was remanded but only for the limited
purpose of further evaluation of a calculation error by the EPA.
150

151

152

2.

Lion Oil Co. v. EPA

A second case involving similar circumstances was Lion Oil Company
v. EPA. This case was argued before the Eighth Circuit instead of the D.C.
153

Circuit. Lion Oil is a small refinery in El Dorado, Arkansas. Like the
previous case, the refinery received RFS program exemptions in 2012 and
petitioned the EPA for additional exemptions in 2013. The EPA denied
the petition. The EPA objected to this venue.
The EPA’s decision was made in a similar fashion to Hermes. The
DOE was consulted, reviewed the refineries’ data, and applied that data to
both the disproportionate impacts and viability indices. The DOE
concluded that Lion Oil did not indicate a disproportionate economic
hardship, as they did not score high enough on the viability index. Unlike
Hermes, the EPA did not re-analyze either index, stating that they
“evaluate[d] viability . . . in the same manner that the DOE considers
viability in its own methodology.”
Like Hermes, Lion Oil argued that the change in the scoring structure
of the indices was unlawful. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. Specifically, the
EPA stated that the addition of an intermediate scoring system “more
accurately characterize[s] the impacts of compliance costs . . . or individual
special events . . . on a refinery.” The Eighth Circuit pointed out:
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Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 982.
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Id. at 980.
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Id.
Id. at 979.
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Id. The EPA argued that the D.C. Circuit was the appropriate venue to bring this action
because their decision had a nationwide scope. Id. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, pointing
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out that to have the effect of nationwide scope the EPA must publish their findings in denying
the petition, not just provide them to the petitioner. Id. at 982. Because the EPA did not
make their findings available to the public, the Eighth Circuit could hear the case. Id.
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Id. at 980.
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at 983.
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Id.
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[An agency] need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old
one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to
be better, which the conscious change of course adequately
indicates.
This means, just like in Hermes, that if a reasonable explanation is
given, the agency can implement an adjusted policy. Lion Oil further argued
that this change should have gone through a rule-making process. The
Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating that the EPA conducted its decision from
the direction of Congress by consulting with the DOE and considering the
conclusions of the 2011 study.
Lion Oil also argued that the EPA’s use of viability within the
interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” was
unreasonable. Again, the Eighth Circuit applied Chevron deference and
found ambiguity under Chevron step one, and a reasonable statutory
interpretation under Chevron step two. Specifically, the Court of Appeals
quoted Hermes when concluding that EPA’s interpretation was reasonable:
[T]he relative costs of compliance alone cannot demonstrate
economic hardship because all refineries face a direct cost
associated with participation in the program. Of course, some
refineries will face higher costs than others, but whether those costs
impose disproportionate hardship on a given refinery presents a
different question.169 EPA adopted DOE’s determination “that
the best way to measure ‘hardship’ entailed examining the impact
of compliance costs on a refinery’s ability to maintain profitability
and competitiveness—i.e., viability—in the long term.”
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Id. (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)).
Id. at 983–84.
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Id. at 984.
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See id.
169
Id. (quoting Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (emphasis
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omitted).
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III. THE SINCLAIR DECISION

A. Facts and Procedural Posture
Sinclair’s two Wyoming refineries met the RFS program definition of
“small refinery.” Thus, the refineries were exempt from the RFS statutory
requirements until 2011. In addition, through the 2011 study, the DOE
found that Sinclair’s refineries met the “disproportionate economic
hardship” definition and extended its exemption to 2013.
Nearing the end of the exemption period, Sinclair petitioned the EPA
to allow their small refineries to remain exempt. They argued that their
business would continue to experience “disproportionate economic
hardships” should the exemptions from the RFS program be lifted. The
EPA consulted with the DOE, who recommended a partial exemption be
granted to Sinclair. The EPA disagreed with the DOE’s approach and
denied the petition after considering the aspects of the viability index as the
agency had considered before. The EPA concluded that Sinclair’s
refineries were capable of remaining profitable after covering the program
costs. Sinclair filed a petition for review with the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Tenth Circuit
granted the petition.
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Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2017); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(1)(K) (defining “small refinery” as “a refinery for which the average aggregate daily
crude oil throughput for a calendar year (as determined by dividing the aggregate throughput
for the calendar year by the number of days in the calendar year) does not exceed 75,000
barrels.”).
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Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 989–90.
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Id. at 990.
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Id.
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Id. at 1002 (Lucero, J., dissenting). Contained within the Consolidated Appropriations Act
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of 2016, Congress directed the DOE to adjust their recommendations when a refiner scoring
matrix was greater than one for viability or structural impact categories. Id. Congress stated
that the recommendation to the EPA should be a fifty percent waiver. Id. Judge Lucero
pointed out that this direction came in an “explanatory statement” and did not amend §
7545(o)(9). Id. (citing Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 129
Stat. 2242 (2015)).
177
Id. at 994.
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Id. at 990.
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Id.
Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (requiring courts to review agency actions and determine

if final decisions were made within the scope of power granted by Congress).
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The Tenth Circuit’s Decision

The court of appeals first analyzed the issue of deference, as ultimately,
the court’s final decision stemmed from its determination of this issue. Prior
to making a final decision, both the EPA and Sinclair were afforded the
opportunity to argue which type of deference, if any, should be applied.
The EPA argued that Chevron deference should apply. The agency
pointed to the ruling in Hermes and Lion Oil, indicating that the scenarios
were on point with the case at hand. The EPA spelled out the facts of the
case as they applied to deference determination. It argued:
Chevron deference applies here because (1) Congress delegated
authority to EPA to interpret the phrase “disproportionate
economic hardship;” (2) other relevant factors identified by the
Supreme Court weigh heavily in favor of affording Chevron
deference in this context; and (3) EPA’s decisions carry the force
of law and constitute precedent within the agency.
The analysis broke each of these points down. The first is a
restatement of the direction Congress gave the EPA with respect to the RFS
program. Under the second point, the EPA pointed out that this
interpretation is an interstitial issue, or an issue which is a portion of a
broader definition which Congress delegated to the agency to determine.
Because Congress required the EPA to administer and promulgate rules for
the RFS program, creating a definition for “disproportionate economic
hardship” was within the scope of their authority. The EPA also argued
for further congressional authority because the determination to grant an
exemption extension petition would affect the obligations a refinery needed
to meet in subsequent years. Thus, according to the EPA, the decision
carried the weight of law.
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Respondent’s Supplemental Brief on the Applicability of Chevron Deference at 5, Sinclair
Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-9532) [hereinafter Resp’t’s
Suppl. Br.]. Specifically citing Mead, the EPA noted Chevron applies “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)).
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Id. at 7.
183

Id.
Id. at 8.
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Id. at 9 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165 (2007)).
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Sinclair disagreed and challenged the applicability of deference. The
analysis focused on Edelman v. Lynchburg College, in which the Supreme
Court held “there is no need to resolve deference issues when there is no
need for deference.” Sinclair stated that there is no need to “settle on any
degree of deference” to an agency’s statutory interpretation where that
interpretation “is clearly wrong.” Specifically, Sinclair argued that the
interpretation did not follow the plain meaning of the words
“disproportionate economic hardship” and congressional intent. The
analysis continued by rejecting both Chevron and Skidmore deference
arguments. For Skidmore, Sinclair conceded that the court could grant a
review of this type of deference but still asserted the interpretation would
fail because it was not persuasive. Sinclair argued four points in opposing
the application of Chevron.
First, the record did not reflect that Congress gave authority to define
“disproportionate economic hardship.” Congress authorized the EPA to
promulgate rules for some of the RFS program but not for the “small
refinery exemption provisions.” Sinclair claimed that the statute failed to
provide guidance on how to define “disproportionate economic
hardship.” Specifically, it did not address whether the EPA should change
the meaning to an element involving a total refinery shut down.
Second, the EPA did not have a review process—one which included
notice and comment periods—for Sinclair’s petition. A petition for an
exemption extension was filed and denied without a review process.
Furthermore, while the review process requirements were known from past
petition denials, there was no opportunity for comment by outside sources
prior to the process being adopted.
Third, the head of the agency did not make this interpretation.
Instead, a mid-level official made the denial. On this point, Sinclair
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Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 9, Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-9532) [hereinafter Pet’r’s Suppl. Br.].
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194
Id. at 10.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 11.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 12.
193

2019]

USING SKIDMORE TO DANCE AROUND CHEVRON

221

appeared to be pointing to the final petition decision rather than the
adoption of an interpretation. Their argument relied on Mead, claiming that
the only appropriate time for Chevron to apply is when the head of an
agency makes the ruling.
Fourth, the interpretation scenario did not reflect the requirements of
Chevron deference. Sinclair stated that there are indicators an agency must
satisfy to initiate the Chevron discussion. These include “the agency’s
expertise, the importance of the question to the agency’s administration of
the statute, and the degree of consideration the agency has given the
question.” Sinclair argued that the EPA’s expertise lies in environmental
matters but not in the “economic issues involved in operating a refinery or
what may amount to ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ in the refinery
business.” In addition, the small refinery exemption is a relatively
insignificant portion of the EPA’s day to day requirements regulating the
RFS program under the CAA. Finally, the record did not indicate that the
EPA explored what Congress intended as the definition of
“disproportionate economic hardship.” The EPA merely inserted its own
meaning for the term. For these reasons, Sinclair contended that Chevron
deference was not appropriate.
In their decision, The Tenth Circuit determined that Skidmore
deference was appropriate. The analysis relied on the guidance of Mead,
where the Supreme Court determined classification rulings should carry the
same weight as “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines.” Mead determined that agency
action “‘does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial
deference otherwise its due,’ but rather, whether courts provide Chevron
deference ‘depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used
and the nature of the question at issue.’” Specifically, a court must analyze
“the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the
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Id. at 13–14 (quoting WildEarth Guardians v. NPS, 703 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013)).
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Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 14.
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Id. Additionally, Sinclair points out that while the EPA did promulgate rules, the agency
did not define the term “disproportionate economic hardship.” Id. at 10.
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U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
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complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the agency
had given the question over a long period of time.” Put simply, the focal
inquiry is whether the decision was created through a rulemaking process
with the force of law or on a case-by-case analysis.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that while Congress appointed the EPA
to promulgate RFS program regulations, they did not do so for small
refinery exemptions. Therefore, the EPA was not required to go through
a rule-making process. Furthermore, because Sinclair submitted the
application and the EPA’s decision was made without a notice and comment
period or oral arguments, the exemption extension decision was not
formally adjudicated. Finally, the decision does not have a precedential
effect for other petitioners as each petition must be decided on a case-bycase basis.
The Tenth Circuit, using Skidmore deference, concluded that the
“EPA’s interpretation takes the statutory language too far.” Specifically, the
EPA’s analysis misinterpreted the definition of hardship and ignored two
metrics of the DOE’s three-factored test for measuring the viability index.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the EPA’s decision was primarily based on
the long-term viability of the refinery. The interpretation shows that the
EPA is interested solely in this effect, which is outside the scope of statutory
authority.
The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Hermes and Lion Oil
based on two factors. First, the D.C. and Eighth Circuits applied the wrong
deference test. The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that Mead established
Skidmore deference as the appropriate standard for “informal adjudication
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Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
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1441(e)(2) in this analysis, and thus, the question of whether promulgating exemption
extension rules fell within the EPA’s granted authority was never examined.
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Id.
Id. The Court also discussed two more factors. Id. The first factor was that the head of the
EPA did not make the decision; Chevron deference should be granted when an agency
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action was “formal and culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency,
not a nonbinding disposition by a low-level agency official.” Id. (quoting Groff v. U.S., 493
F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The second factor was that viability analysis is a relatively
new practice. Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992.
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that ‘does not carry the force of law.’” Second, in Sinclair, the EPA’s
determination was based on the long-term viability as the “necessary, if not
the sole, factor.” The Tenth Circuit argued this determination
distinguished the case because the EPA’s rejection was based on a single
term, and the Hermes and Lion Oil cases were determined on the DOE’s
multi-factor indices. As a result, the analysis agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s
decision to vacate the EPA’s decision and remanded for further
proceedings.
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C.

Judge Lucero’s Dissenting Opinion

Judge Lucero made three arguments in his dissent. First, the majority’s
analysis was flawed regarding the EPA’s determination of Sinclair’s
petition. Second, there was no need to determine deference, as Congress
was clear that petitions should be analyzed with the DOE’s input, the DOE’s
2011 study, and any other economic factors. Third, Judge Lucero argued
the majority tried to distinguish this case from Hermes and Lion Oil, but its
analysis and comparison were inaccurate.
Judge Lucero pointed out that the EPA considered and used the
DOE’s three-factor test in making its decision, which specifically included
claims from Sinclair that fit under the special events metric (i.e. a onetime
loss due to a fire in the refinery). Furthermore, the EPA invited the DOE’s
opinion due to the DOE’s “expertise in evaluating economic conditions at
U.S. refineries, which [the EPA] used in developing an assessment process
for identifying when ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ exists in the
context of the [RFS] program.” After the EPA received the DOE’s
recommendation, they reviewed the data and applied the same indices the
DOE employed. The EPA determined that the refinery scored a 1.6 on
the compliance cost index and a zero on the viability index. In order to
receive the exemption, a refinery must score greater than one in both
categories. Judge Lucero noted the EPA went to great lengths in their
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reasoning to explain what metrics were used to calculate this score. The
dissenting opinion concluded that the only interpretation to take from that
analysis was that a multi-factored—not a single factor—test was applied.
Judge Lucero’s second argument was that determining which
deference standard to apply was unnecessary. Congress directed the EPA
to use the DOE’s study when determining exemption petitions. Because
the study outlined the basic test the EPA adopted, the agency did not exceed
their statutory authority. The Supreme Court has held that in matters
where a reasonable interpretation of the law exists, determining deference
is unnecessary. Judge Lucero argued that the EPA’s interpretation to read
into the refinery’s health was reasonable, as the agency considered both the
DOE’s recommendation and the study’s findings.
Finally, Judge Lucero pointed out that Hermes and Lion Oil are cases
in which two other circuits agreed with the approach adopted by the EPA.
The majority erroneously focused on specific words within the EPA’s
decision. The analysis led to a conclusion that the EPA was considering
only one factor in the viability index, when in fact the agency was using the
same factored tests used in Hermes and Lion Oil. The majority’s argument
that this case was distinct from Hermes and Lion Oil cases relies on that
conclusion, as well as the type of deference granted. Judge Lucero disagreed
and pointed out that the majority’s conclusion was misguided. Judge
Lucero supported the conclusions of Hermes and Lion Oil, holding this
nuanced approach to the evaluation of exemption extension petitions was
appropriate.
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Was Deference Applied Correctly?
The first question to focus on when analyzing deference for the Sinclair
case is what the court was trying to determine. Did the EPA exceed the
statutory authority when adding an interpretation to the definition of
233
234

Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 n.8 (2002) (explaining “there is no

need to resolve deference issues when there is no need for deference”).
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Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
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Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii).
237
Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (citing Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114).
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Id. at 1002.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1002–03.
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“disproportionate economic hardship?” Determining which deference
standard to apply is important as different types of deference carry different
weights for the decision maker. Because Chevron deference is applied to
interpretations with the force of law, it is regarded as carrying more weight
within courts. As two other circuits, which both applied Chevron, came
to alternate conclusions, it is possible that the type of deference applied
impacts the outcome.
243

244

245

1. Arguments that Deference Should Not Apply
The arguments made by Sinclair and Judge Lucero that no deference
should apply are misguided. While Sinclair discussed at length why
Chevron deference should not apply, their initial argument was because the
EPA’s definition of “disproportionate economic hardship” includes a
potential refinery shutdown, the agency has effectively created a term
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words. Sinclair used Edelman
and General Dynamics to support their claim. However, the court in
Edelman pointed out that determining deference is unnecessary when the
rule or definition used is “not only a reasonable one but the position [the
court] would adopt even if there were no formal rule and we were
interpreting the statute from scratch.” In this context, Edelman would only
apply where the court could completely agree with the agency’s
interpretation. Thus, Sinclair pointed to General Dynamics, where the court
explained that deference does not need to be determined when an agency’s
interpretation is “clearly wrong.” However, two other circuit courts have
ruled in favor of the EPA’s interpretation. Because other courts have ruled
in an agency’s favor regarding the same issue, the argument that the EPA is
“clearly wrong” loses weight.
Sinclair also argued that the interpretation did not go through any
notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, or “relatively formal
procedure.” However, that is not an accurate representation. Under the
direction of § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), the EPA promulgated regulations for the
246
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250

251
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Borgen, supra note 59, at 3.
Id. at 4.
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Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co. v. EPA,
792 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 2015).
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Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 9.
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See generally Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
248
Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114.
249
Gen. Dynamics, U.S. 581 at 600.
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See generally Hermes, 787 F.3d 568; Lion Oil, 792 F.3d 978.
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Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 11.
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RFS program. Those regulations are listed under 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441 and
include a provision about exemption extension petitions. This regulation
was not listed in the Hermes or Lion Oil cases, and the only party to
mention § 80.1441(e)(2), interestingly enough, was Sinclair in their
supplemental brief. The exemption extension program did go through a
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. There is little direction
provided to the regulated community with respect to what exactly the EPA
will consider within a petition application. However, within the preamble to
the Federal Register, where the rule was listed, the EPA specifically
addressed that the decision-making process must consider the DOE’s
economic impacts study. Sinclair was correct that the specific question as
to the definition of “disproportionate economic hardship” was not raised
during the promulgation of § 80.1441, but it was part of the DOE’s study
which was discussed and commented on by the EPA and third parties.
252

253

254

255

256

257

252

42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2009). The regulation reads:
Not later than 1 year after August 8, 2005, the Administrator shall promulgate
regulations to ensure that gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the United
States (except in noncontiguous States or territories), on an annual average basis,
contains the applicable volume of renewable fuel determined in accordance with
subparagraph (B).

Id.
253

40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2) (2014). The regulation reads as follows:
A refiner may petition the Administrator for an extension of its small refinery
exemption, based on disproportionate economic hardship, at any time.
(i) A petition for an extension of the small refinery exemption must specify the
factors that demonstrate a disproportionate economic hardship and must provide
a detailed discussion regarding the hardship the refinery would face in producing
transportation fuel meeting the requirements of § 80.1405 and the date the refiner
anticipates that compliance with the requirements can reasonably be achieved at
the small refinery.
(ii) The Administrator shall act on such a petition not later than 90 days after the
date of receipt of the petition.
(iii) In order to qualify for an extension of its small refinery exemption, a refinery
must meet the definition of “small refinery” in § 80.1401 for the most recent full
calendar year prior to seeking an extension and must be projected to meet the
definition of “small refinery” in § 80.1401 for the year or years for which an
exemption is sought. Failure to meet the definition of small refinery for any
calendar year for which an exemption was granted would invalidate the exemption
for that calendar year.

Id.
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Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 10.
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,735–14,736 (Mar. 26,
2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
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Judge Lucero also argued that deference should not apply under

Edelman. It is important to note that the argument used is the opposite
258

argument made by Sinclair in their supplemental brief. Because Congress
instructed the EPA to review exemption extension petitions while
considering the DOE’s 2011 study, and because the definition of
“disproportionate economic hardship” stemmed from that study,
congressional intent is clear. Stated simply, because Congress directed the
EPA to consider the study, and the study defined “disproportionate
economic hardship,” the EPA did not exceed its authority.
However, Judge Lucero’s point is too narrow to answer whether the
direction from Congress was ambiguous. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) provides
clear direction: “In evaluating a petition under clause (i), the Administrator,
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall consider the findings of
the study under subparagraph (A)(ii) and other economic factors.”
However, ambiguity lies in whether authority was granted to adopt
definitions laid out in the DOE’s 2011 study. Under Judge Lucero’s line of
reasoning, the concept of why deference is given in the first place is
overlooked. Deference is given when ambiguity exists within congressional
direction. Because this case examines whether Congress intended the EPA
to interpret what a “disproportionate economic hardship” means, some
form of deference should be granted.
259

260

261

2.

Should Skidmore Deference be Applied?

Next, the focus shifts to whether the definition, “disproportionate
economic hardship,” should be granted Skidmore deference as the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied to it in Sinclair. For Skidmore to apply,
the agency must have made a statutory interpretation of “disproportionate
economic hardship” without a legal requirement. Specifically, did
Congress intend for the EPA to promulgate rules to create a definition? The
Court of Appeals relied on Mead to determine that Chevron deference was
not appropriate because any decision would not carry the force of law.
262

263

258

Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 1001 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting) (citing Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (“[T]here is no
need to resolve deference issues when there is no need for deference.”)).
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42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii); Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
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42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii).
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Borgen, supra note 59, at 4.
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Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992-93.
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Id. at 998.
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In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit examined the four components for
determining which type of deference to apply. The Tenth Circuit’s
conclusion that Congress did not intend to grant the EPA authority to
promulgate rules for the small refinery exemption extension is significant.
However, the fact that 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441 exists was not discussed in the
Tenth Circuit’s analysis.
The EPA determined that the small refinery exemption program fell
within the guidelines of § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). As such, regulations were
promulgated through a rulemaking process. As the court of appeals did
not address constitutionality or make any mention of the regulation in its
analysis, it is clear that when determining the deference standard, § 80.1441
was not taken into consideration. Because a regulation was promulgated,
the court of appeals can no longer conclude that the EPA is making
interpretations like those “contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines.” Their analysis is incomplete, and thus, the
conclusion to apply Skidmore deference over Chevron deference is
misguided.
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268

269

270
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Id. at 991. The court of appeals quoted Skidmore directly, laying out “the weight courts
provide an administrative judgment ‘will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.’” Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
265
The four points the court of appeals makes are as follows. First, Congress did not intend
to grant the EPA authority to promulgate rules for the small refinery exemption. Id. at 992.
As such, the review process was informal, and the definition of “disproportionate economic
hardship” was not considered under a formal rulemaking process. Id. Second, the head of
the EPA did not make the final decision. Id. (citing Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343,
1352 (Fed. Cir 2007) (finding that for Chevron to apply the decision must be “formal and
culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency, not a nonbinding
disposition by a low-level agency official.”)). Third, because the EPA did not publish the
decision and make it available to third parties, it was not precedential and revealed that all
decisions will be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. Finally, the disproportionate
economic hardship analysis was relatively new. Id.
266
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Id.
See generally 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2) (2014) (promulgating regulations for the RFS

Program).
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42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2009).
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See generally Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,735–14,736
(Mar. 26, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
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Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
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3. Should Chevron Deference be Applied?
As rules have been promulgated, any decision created would carry the
force of law, which signifies Chevron deference could be appropriate.
However, for Chevron to apply, both prongs of the Chevron two-step must
be met. Under Chevron step one, The question at issue is whether
Congress gave clear directions as to the definition or how to determine a
“disproportionate economic hardship.” Within the framework of §
7545(o), Congress did not define the term and provided limited guidance
for how the exemption program should be established. Thus, because the
statute directs the EPA to create an exemption extension program but does
not define the exact process in which it is to be conducted and Congress has
not discussed the question at issue, Chevron step one is met.
The reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of a “permissible
construction of the statute” is Chevron step two. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii)
directs the EPA to evaluate exemption extension petitions in consultation
with the DOE and consider the DOE’s 2011 study in addition to any other
economic factors. Congress did not provide additional direction. When a
statute is silent with respect to all potentially relevant factors, it is eminently
reasonable to conclude that silence is meant to convey “nothing more than
a refusal to tie the agency’s hands.” Had Congress been more specific with
their directions under the statute, potential unforeseen conflicts could have
arisen once the DOE’s study concluded. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out in
Hermes, incorporating the methodology from the 2011 study with a set
viability index to determine whether a refinery experienced a
“disproportionate economic hardship” was a reasonable interpretation of
the statute. In fact, by keeping the same language as the 2011 study, the
EPA created continuity in the decision-making process, which is well within
the scope of the statute. Thus, Chevron step two is met, and the Tenth
Circuit should have applied Chevron deference.
Further, the court of appeal’s approach should have incorporated the
guidelines set out in Barnhart, as the definition of interpretive rules were
271
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275
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Borgen, supra note 59, at 4.
Kemp, supra note 44.
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Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Id. at 575.
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See Kemp, supra note 44.
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Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA, 750 F.3d 909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
277
Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575.
272

278

Id.

230

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

like the kind at issue in that case. The question is whether adopting the
two-pronged test and the definition of “disproportionate economic
hardship” laid out in the DOE’s 2011 study falls within congressional intent.
As the statute clearly points out, the EPA should consider the findings of
the study in developing their exemption extension program. Congressional
intent is clear. Congress entrusted the EPA with this task as an expert
agency, and any shortcomings in their expertise would be addressed through
their required consultation with the DOE.
The only issue a Barnhart analysis would face is the length of time the
EPA spent in deciding these cases. As the program was new, the agency had
relatively few years of experience issuing decisions on these cases. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that this time requirement is
a relic of the pre-Chevron era. He stated that the time requirement should
simply enforce the rationale for an outcome under the analysis. When
considering the policy behind giving deference under Chevron, the time
component seems to be a small point, one that focuses on how consistent
an agency decision has been. While the EPA ruled on relatively few of
these exemption extensions, their analysis has been consistent. The larger
question of legislative intent is the more important aspect of the analysis and
should be given greater weight. More specifically, Chevron should apply
because Congress instructed the EPA to follow the 2011 study prior to the
completion of the study, thus intending for the agency to make program
interpretations.
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See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002) (holding that on review, the court must
decide “(1) whether the statute unambiguously forbids [a given] interpretation, and if not, (2)
whether the interpretation exceeds permissible bounds.”) (citing Chevron, Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
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Brendan C. Selby, Internal Agency Review, Authoritativeness, and Mead, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 556 (2013).
285
See generally Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co.
v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015).
286
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ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 778 (2007) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REV. 187, 218 (2006)).
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See id. (noting that Mead shifted the court’s focus to intention and when “Congress intends
courts to defer, courts should defer.”).
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Interpretations of the EPA’s “Disproportionate Economic Hardship”
1. The D.C. and Eighth Circuit’s Interpretation

In both the Hermes and Lion Oil cases, the EPA assessed
“disproportionate economic hardships” using the DOE’s viability and
disproportionate impacts indices. The Eighth Circuit held that the EPA
followed the direction of Congress by consulting with the DOE and
considering the 2011 study. The D.C. Circuit made the same conclusion,
and the most important message to take away from Hermes is the following:
DOE concluded, and EPA agreed, that the relative costs of
compliance alone cannot demonstrate economic hardship because
all refineries face a direct cost associated with participation in the
program. Of course, some refineries will face higher costs than
others, but whether those costs impose disproportionate hardship
on a given refinery presents a different question. DOE determined
that the best way to measure “hardship” entailed examining the
impact of compliance costs on a refinery’s ability to maintain
profitability and competitiveness—i.e., viability—in the long term.
EPA adopted DOE’s understanding, and that choice [granted
through Chevron deference] lies well within the agency’s
discretion.
The requirements of the RFS program created costs for all refineries.
However, those costs will not affect each refinery in the same manner. The
purpose of the exemption was to make sure those refineries having the most
difficulty recovering from the associated costs (such as small refineries)
would not fail and competition in the market would remain high. The
exemption was not created for small refineries suffering from a minor
hardship. The EPA and the DOE established a system in which a line was
drawn to ensure that the refineries still needing the exemption would receive
the relief sought. While the agency’s decisions were not published, the
methodology was nonetheless consistent between petitions, a fact
288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295
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recognized between the D.C. and Eighth Circuit but not shared with the
Tenth Circuit.
296

2. The Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation
The majority recognized the methods used by the EPA in the Sinclair
case as being the same applied in Hermes and Lion Oil. However, the
majority opinion focused on a very specific word in an unusual way. To
analyze that process, it is important to evaluate the Tenth Circuit’s analysis.
First, it discusses the EPA’s rationale for not following the DOE’s partial
exemption recommendation:
In the discussion that follows, EPA independently reviews the
information as we consider other economic factors in our
analysis, including, but not limited to, profitability, net income,
cash flow and cash balances, gross and net refining margins,
ability to pay for refinery improvement projects, corporate
structure, debt and other financial obligations, RIN prices, and
the cost of compliance through RIN purchases. After considering
all of this information, EPA finds [the Sinclair, Wyoming
refinery] will not experience “disproportionate economic
hardship” from compliance with the RFS program. As an initial
matter, EPA recognizes its decision differs from DOE’s
recommendation. The CAA requires that EPA act on a small
refinery’s petition “in consultation with” DOE, “consider[ing] the
findings of” the DOE Small Refinery Study and “other economic
factors.” EPA gives weight to DOE’s technical evaluation and
scoring of the refinery, recognizing that DOE has more
experience in assessing, e.g., the impact of a particular [sic] special
event, and how to balance short-term events with longer term
planning and concerns over viability. However, EPA has
297

responsibility for making the ultimate decision after considering
DOE’s evaluation and recommendation, and continues to
believe that the proper interpretation of the statutory
prerequisite—disproportionate economic hardship—involves
“examining the impact of compliance costs on a refinery’s ability
to maintain profitability and competitiveness—i.e. viability—in the
long term.”
298

296

See generally Hermes, 787 F.3d 568; Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the EPA must consider the DOE study, review other economic factors, and
engage in the DOE consultation when evaluating refinery petitions for exemption
extensions).
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Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2017).
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Id. at 995 (quoting J.A. Vol. 1 at 17–18 (quoting 32 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) and, in the
last sentence, Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575) (emphasis added)).
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The Tenth Circuit used this rationale to conclude that the EPA is only
considering whether a refinery will face a closure if an exemption extension
is not granted. Next, the majority opinion used the following excerpt from
the EPA’s decision to clarify their point:
EPA does not doubt that Sinclair incurred costs, both planned
and unplanned, which affected profitability. However, as
discussed above, EPA believes that it is necessary to show that
299

RFS compliance will have an impact on the refinery’s ongoing
future viability to be eligible for an exemption. After considering
the full financial picture of [the Sinclair refinery] for 2014 and
prior years, EPA does not find that compliance with RFS for 2014
would threaten [the Sinclair refinery]’s viability. Given [the
Sinclair refinery]’s situation, we do not believe that an RFS
exemption for [the Sinclair refinery] is justified under the
statutory requirement of a disproportionate economic hardship.
From that excerpt, the majority’s opinion focuses on the word
“necessary”. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit claimed that because the EPA
used this word, they were no longer considering all three metrics of the
viability index laid out in the DOE’s 2011 study. However, this argument
is a very narrow interpretation of the word “necessary.” To say that the EPA
is only considering long-term effects does not fall in line with the rationale
laid out in the agency’s explanation. In consideration of the first two
metrics (compliance costs and special events), the EPA argues that it is
“necessary” to also consider the third metric of the viability index: long-term
effects. Such a consideration must not be interpreted to mean that longterm viability is the only factor being considered. The EPA is simply
showing that while a refinery may have costs associated with compliance or
special events, it also needs to show that those costs will have a long-standing
impact that could result in a shutdown, although a potential shutdown is not
necessary. In effect, one needs to show that the cost of compliance will
have a disproportionate economic hardship and place the future of the
300
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302

303

304

305

306
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Id. (citing J.A. Vol. 1. at 19–20).
Id. at 996. (citing J.A. Vol. 1 at 20–21 (emphasis added)).
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Id. at 996. (citing J.A. Vol. 1 at 20–21).
Id. at 1001 n.2 (Lucero, J., dissenting). “The viability factor addresses

three types of metrics that could impact long-term competitiveness, none of which necessarily
would cause a closure of the facility in the near term . . . .” Id. (citing Resp’t’s. Suppl. Br.,
supra note 181, at 38–39).
306

Id.
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refinery at risk. Without this showing, the bar for the viability index would
be low, and an exemption could be easily granted to any small refinery
(assuming they score greater than one on the impacts index), which is not
the purpose of the exemption. The exemption’s purpose is to mitigate the
impacts of the program and maintain strong competition.
In his dissent, Judge Lucero points out the inaccuracy of the majority’s
claim. The dissent’s argument comes down to this point: if the EPA
intended to focus only on long-term viability, why mention the other
measurable impacts at all? The EPA spends a lot of time discussing the
two indices and the process in which they determine whether an exemption
extension should be granted. Judge Lucero argues that had the majority
paid attention to those comments, their conclusion would reflect
consideration consistent with previous decisions of the three factors of the
viability index approach. Specifically, the EPA stated that an indication that
the cost of compliance or a special event creates “an inability to increase
efficiency to remain competitive” in the long term is all that is necessary to
meet the requirements of the index. An impending closure is not required
to score high enough on the viability index.
Interestingly, the majority does address Judge Lucero’s point. They
state that their review of the arguments does not take the EPA’s comments
in isolation and that the process employed is taken wholly into
consideration. However, their conclusion is inconsistent with this
statement. Judge Lucero is correct in his assertion that had the majority
considered the EPA’s process in its entirety, they would have concluded that
this nuanced approach has a multiple-step requirement. In addition, had
the majority seen this approach, their conclusion would have been
consistent with the conclusions discussed in both the Hermes and Lion Oil
cases.
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The exemption was meant to allow refineries to continue to invest in efficiency
improvements. Without improvements a small refinery may not be able to compete, the
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Outcome of the Case

While the arguments of this case are narrow, Sinclair still should have
prevailed but for several different reasons. The court of appeals applied the
wrong form of deference, and their interpretation of the EPA’s reviewal
process was narrow and misguided. However, Sinclair could have won for
the procedural reason under 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2)(ii), which requires
that the EPA administrator is required to act on exemption extension
provisions. Both Sinclair and the court of appeals discussed, a mid-level
EPA agent made the decision, which is a violation of 40 C.F.R. §
80.1441(e)(2)(ii). However, the result of Sinclair prevailing would simply
have the case remanded to the EPA administrator's review pursuant to the
regulation standard.
Upon remand, the result should be consistent with Hermes and Lion
Oil. The standard set in place upon the direction of the DOE’s 2011 study
was determined a reasonable interpretation of the authority granted to the
EPA by Congress. As the EPA did not deviate from that standard, the
Tenth Circuit should have had a conclusion consistent with the D.C. and
Eighth Circuits.
318
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V. CONCLUSION
Within the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress directed the EPA to
promulgate rules to create a Renewable Fuel Standards program. Within
that program, Congress delegated authority to the EPA to create an
exemption extension program. Specifically, exemptions would be
reviewed after consultation with the DOE and careful consideration of the
DOE’s 2011 study and other economic factors. The EPA promulgated
rules for the RFS program through a rulemaking process, including rules
for the exemption extension program.
Following the guidelines set in the DOE’s 2011 study, the EPA
adopted a two-prong test to determine if a refinery met the requirements for
321
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“disproportionate economic hardship” reasonable).
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an exemption due to “disproportionate economic hardship.” Those
prongs include a disproportionate impacts index and a viability index. In
order to qualify for an exemption, a refinery would need to score above one
on each of the indices.
The D.C. Circuit in Hermes and the Eighth Circuit in Lion Oil both
reviewed the EPA’s exemption program and came to similar conclusions.
Both granted Chevron deference regarding the question of whether the
term “disproportionate economic hardship” was defined correctly within
the scope of power granted to the EPA. Both concluded that the
interpretation was reasonable and affirmed the decision.
When presented with a similar case, however, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals came to a different conclusion. Using Mead, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Chevron deference was not appropriate and applied
Skidmore deference. However, the court failed to consider 40 C.F.R. §
80.1441. Because the EPA subjected the exemption extension program to
a rulemaking process, the court of appeals should have applied Chevron
deference. Furthermore, using a Barnhart analysis, Chevron should apply
because the adoption of the two-pronged test fell within the agency’s
interpretive authority. The decision was based on a rule granted through
congressional authority. As the D.C. and Eighth Circuits pointed out, that
standard is a reasonable interpretation.
Judge Lucero’s dissent as to the majority’s focus on the word necessary
was accurate. The majority opinion applied a narrow review of the EPA’s
standard. By focusing on insignificant words, the Tenth Circuit
inaccurately applied the facts and thus misinterpreted the extension
exemption reviewal process. The EPA applied a process in which both
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and whether compliance costs are ‘likely to lead to shut down.’” Id.
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indices were required to meet a certain score. Within the viability index, it
is necessary to consider the long-term impacts of the program on the
refinery’s ability to compete and not necessarily on whether the refinery will
shut down. Had the court of appeals considered the EPA’s comments on
the matter, their conclusion would have been similar to other circuit
decisions.
While Sinclair still should have won on a procedural technicality, the
overall result should have been in favor of the EPA’s decision. The point of
the RFS exemption program is to provide some relief to small refineries.
The idea is to level the playing field and foster competition. The program
is designed to assist facilities that face an inability to compete in the market,
which could lead to a closure due to a “disproportionate economic
hardship” caused by the RFS program. It is not a means to grant relief for
any hardship, only those which have dire consequences and will harm
market competition in the long run.
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